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The idea of violence during Reconstruction by now conjures 
a stereotyped mental picture. Invariably, the time is mid-
ght. Scattered clouds allow the moon only brief glimpses of 
~earthbound scene. But the light f r om even this hidden 
.rce is sufficient to reveal the silent band of draped figures 
.:ng through the night. The group surrounds a tiny cabin 
~the muffled voice of the leader calls a Negro to the porch. 
ost invisible in the shadows, the victim emerges from the 
per gloom of the door. Perhaps merely a lashing awaits 
, though he may face an impromptu lynching, a load of 00 
kshot, a pistol ball, or a mutilating Bowie knife . After t he 
is done, two blasts of the leader's whistle signal a general 
ounting of the hooded figures. Then, in a st illness broken 
·by horses' hoofs or possibly the sounds of agony from the 
'~of raw flesh which had once been a human being, the still-
nt band departs. 
Yet such Ku Klux Klan visitations formed only a small 
of the turbulence in Reconstr uction Alabama. Federal 
ters, white and black individuals, and secr et Klan-like 
nizations of blacks and whites shared a taste for violence 
hich Alabama played host. Though life undeniably con-
(farmers worried about poor crops, politicians about 
ons, and nearly everybody about the hunger and destitu-
brought on by the war), turmoil formed the backdrop 
nst which the play was held. 
There were many reasons for the violence. The frontier 
+in., and the Old South left a legacy of ferocity. Specific 
called for a solution, with force seemingly the only 
available. Political supremacy called for power t o 
or overthrow it, giving both sides an excuse to uti lize 
While most of the violence came from political 
the most basic reason was the elemental emotion of 
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fear, regardless of the perpetrators. A combination of these 
and other factors produced lawlessness on a large scale in 
certain areas of Alabama. To understand .the extreme con· 
ditions which permeated life in Alabama during this era, this 
fabric of interwoven reasons must be investigated. 
Alabama was no stranger to violence when Reconstruction 
arrived. The state was essentially a frontier area when Ft. 
Sumter was fired on, despite her forty years of statehood. All 
the unrest associated \vith a newly-opened region marked the 
area's development. And the Civil War had done nothing to 
decrease the legacy of roughness willed by the frontier. There 
were two main evidences of this heritage- the individualism 
which called for immediate personal action and the general 
habit of carrying weapons. 
Throughout Reconstruction newspapers commented on the 
impetuosity of Alabamians. Violent action occurred everY· 
where. A recent scholar noted that in the realm of politics, 
passion generally ran too high for objectivity.1 A challeng~ 
at the polls was liable to launch a fight, if not a riot.~ Barroom 
bra w Is and dock fights occurred as t hey always had, especially 
in Mobile, Tuscaloosa, Montgomery, and other river ports. But 
violence in the streets now became common. Fights over the 
right-of-way among pedestrians erupted with regularity. Trivial 
incidents would become provocation to murder. A man would 
walk up to another on the street, say a few words, then draw 
a revolver and fire. Occasionally a heavy horse-whip would 
.replace a more deadly weapon, but rarely were there any pre· 
liminaries to such an attack. J. F James, a Mobilian, explained 
part of this during his arraignment on assault charges by 
observing that as he had been threatened with violence on sight, 
he merely \vanted to strike first.'~ 
Such self-reliance and proclivity to immediate action or 
retaliation would have been less disastrous except for another 
' Robert S. Rhodes, "The Registration of Voters and the Election of Delcgar~s 1 
the Reconstruction Convention in Alabama," Alabama Re1·ielt', VIII (Apn 
1955) 120. • 
" ·New York Timt's, August 30, 1874. 
" Mobile Register and Adt•erliser, October 6, 1865, January 20, 1866, Scprembu I 
I 865, Ju ne 21, 1866, November 17, 1865; Rhodes, "Registration," p. 130. Whe 
told not to shoot anyone by a boy three years his ~enior, an eightccn-year·O 
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frontier habit-carrying deadly weapons . Adver t isements f o1· 
arms were displayed prominently in the newspaper s . Double·-
barrelled shotguns, shor t on r ange but a boon to poor shots, 
rere all the r age, especia lly with the new Lefoucheur breech -
loaders offering the incr eased firepower of car t ridges. For 
those who preferre.d a weapon more easily concealed, derringer s 
and "Colt's Pistols" headed the list. 1 Though the general dis-
order of the count r y dur ing and after the war was blamed for 
the habit, such a milieu does not tell the wh ole st or y. Negroes 
purchased guns for protection an d as a badge of t heir ne\v 
freedom from slavery ; whites wore them f or protection a nd 
from custom.r. Exhibiting the t emper of the times, the Mobile 
Regi~ter and Advertiser decried the ban on carrying concealed 
weapons so long as soldier s wer e present to stir up t r ouble and, 
during one outbreak of crime, noted t hat "Ever y man of fa ir 
~tanding should be allowed to carry weapons of defence . "·~ Editor 
John Forsyth could have saved his breath. Guns were kept 
turned the pistol he had just snapped upon the intruder and ~hot him in the 
chest. Mobile Register and Advertiser, November 17, 1865 . ln Green~boro 
John C. Orrick, a young native, walked up to Alexander Webb, colored Rc~ istcr 
of the 19th District, and shot him. A posse, raised a$ soon as Orrick left th~ 
treet, was unable to locate the young man. 
Mob1:c Rrgisler and Adr,ertiser, October 21, 1865, December 5, 1865, No\·embet 
19, 1865; Ignatius A. Few to William H. Smith, July 19, 1869, William H. Smicb 
Papers (Alabama Department of Archives and H iHory, Montgomery). In an y 
hardware store's advert isements weapons were listed first and in the bol de~t type. 
As lm as 1881, the State Aud iror reported $305,613 worth of tool ~ and brro 
mplements, $354,247 in guns, pistols and dirks. C. Vann \'<foodward, Origin, fl j 
I N,u· Soutb (Baton Rouge, 1951), 160. 
alt~r L. fleming, Chi{ \\7 ar and Recon.tlrucliou 111 Alalltlma (Columbi.t, 1905) , 
691; ~lobile Register and 1idvertiser, January 11, 1866, March 15, 11!66; Ccci1 
[ \lcNair, "Reconstruction in Bullock County," ;\ laba111a F-lislorical Qucn·IC'rly, 
X\' (Spring, 1953), 88-9; U. S. Congress, Senate, The Condition of 1\f fc~ir1 i1z 
ut, lnwrrectio11ar) States : Alabama 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1872, Rep~ 
~,pt. S, 75-76; hereafter cited as Affairs in Alabama. The three volumes 
atm:: to conditions in Alabama, parts 8, 9, and 10 arc also dc~ignatcd as 
~ 4bJmJ, Volumes I, II , and III , which designation i~ hereafter u~cd. 
j1nuary 11, 1866. Such appeals were often made, though a few months la ta it 
111 calling for "all good, law-abid ing citizens" to "no longe r go armed" and 
U} aside all deadly weapons like brave men." April 17, 1866. Evidently the 
fac t that guns and pistol~ were being fi red in all parts of the city, daY .llld 
ht" v;as gcmng on editor John forsyth's nerves. April 18, 18 6 6. The pre -
a ence of carrying arms in :Vlobi lc c:1n be ~cen in t he constant conv ictiom for 
tat lnmc-Deccmbcr 27, 1865, Dl!ccmbcr 29, 11!65, for example. Violations 
1trt cited almo~t daily. 
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in almost every house, and illegal or not, everyone carriec 
weapons . Young men generally wore pistols belted to thei' 
\Vaist in f ull view, while N egroes and the older whites concealfj 
their arms. It was a f ad, just as it had been before the war 
t o go armed.; To some, firearms wer e regarded as toys, to ~ 
s napped at companions as a practical joke. Everyone from 
newsboys to legislators carried arms, with protection fror 
equally-armed opponents usually being the accepted reason. 
In an attempt to control the problem, the legislature outlawe~ 
br ass knuckles and even sling shots.'' But mor e legislative ba. 
was hardly effective in the area of weapon control. Instincl 
and long custom prevailed. 
Violence in Reconstruction Alabama can also be explaine · 
in t erms of yet another legacy. Like the influence of the frontie1 
the ante bellum social structure made its mark in Alabama 
That impress had two distinct facets, both of which wer 
manifest during Reconstruction: the loss of political power b:. 
those who had held unquestioned sway, and the fear of th 
Negro which was rooted in the ante bellum horror of a slar 
revolt. Throughout the ante bellum, South whites had spoke!. 
in apprehensive whisper s of a slave uprising. Neither the fal· 
that none occurred during the war nor that of Negro freedon. 
quieted their fears . Nat Turner and Denmark Vesey were we!!· 
remembered names. Perhaps the fear proved so tenacio~· 
because it was irrational. This problem of social control adde 
urgency t o the problem of regaining political power as th 
whites sought once more to make their society safe. 
The fear of Negroes running amok was real indeed. An 
sizable encounter between blacks and whites was heralded · 
the harbinger of revolt. The idea of armed Negroes, especial! 
after the formation of the Loyal League, brought abolitioni 
prophesies of doom to mind. When armed Negroes stood guar 
at League meetings while their fellows drilled, rumors eire· 
; A /ftlirs in A labam a, I, 75 -6 ; II, 11 66 , 131 8, III, 1686-7, 1835-6. 
' Mobil r Rrgislrr and Adt •rrlisrr, N ovem ber 17, 186 5; Fleming Ci1il 1\'ar,, 
McNair, "Bu llock County," 11 1. 
'' A cts of Alabama, 187 2, 13 0- 1. Bowie knives, too useful to outlaw, wcr~ t 
and pro ved a usefu l sou rce of revenue; Acts of Alabama, /865, 7. 
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lated among the white population.10 When trouble erupted in 
Bladon Springs, Choctaw County, just before Christmas, 1865, 
the Mobile Register and Advertiser tried to calm fears by print-
:ng the truth. Pointing out t hat the excitement was hardly 
worth the name "insurrection," it quoted some of the rumors 
circulating and begged readers not to "repeat and magnify (as 
is almost invariably the case) such r eports. " ll Repeatedly 
Forsyth pointed out the falsity of such rumors and observed 
that, while many had predicted a general insurrection during 
Christmas, no such trouble had occurr ed; nor was it likely to.l2 
Yet until they regained power, t he native white population 
refused to relinquish their fears . Men left won:en and children 
alone only when absolutely necessary, and then with foreboding.13 
Xegroes marched to the polls in military formation until 1876, 
c:nd the riots no doubt occurr ed in part because of the edginess 
of the armed whites. ) ·~ 
Because they had held enough power to keep their position 
secure during the antebellum period, the lack of such security 
during Reconstruction made the position of the native whites 
maddening. They felt there were specific problems to be solved 
-problems which they assumed no one else could master. The 
ative whites felt trapped by a corrupt government from which 
hey could get no justice but which they were powerless to 
hange. From the war's end until the fall of that same year, 
here was no real government in the State. Order, such as it 
as, came from the military posts and the commanders' author-
ty. Then, as Walter L. Fleming put it, the "carpetbegger and 
alawag, using the former slave as an instrument," assumed 
power.'· This was the crowning insult . The military which 
Fleming, Civil \Var, 5-6, 514-15, 56 1-2, 565, 568; Walter L. Fleming, "The 
Formation of the Union League in Alabama," G1tlf States Historical M(l gazine, 
II (September, 1903), 81-3; Albert B. Moore, History of Alabama (Tuscaloosa, 
934), 476; McNair, "Bullock County," 95 . 
December 23, 1865. One of the rumors was that seventeen people had just been 
a mcd at Notasulga as part of a general uprising. 
Januuy 10, 12, 1866. 
letter from Mrs. Campbell Cory, quoted in Euba E. DuBose, "The History of 
unt Stirling." Alabama Historical Quarterly, XXV (Fall , 1963), 327, 322. 
New York Times, April17, 1866; Harry P. Owens, "The Eufau la Riot of 1874,'' 
Al•bama Review, XVI (July, 1963), 232-3, 235-6; sec footnote 10 for ot het 
formation on armed Negroes during elections. 
emmg, Cil'il \Var, 653-4, 656, 262-3; Moore, Alabama, 46·2. 
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sustained this political structure was regarded as an oppressor 
Soldiers as well as outlaws in Federal uniforms gave the natil·. 
whites even more cause for hatred. The occupying army w ... 
not careful and little matters were magnified, as a few soldier· 
gave the rest a bad name. Many of the stories have the rin~ 
of atrocity fictions. Yet true or false, word of outrages com· 
mitted by soldiers and the arbitrary nature of their powti 
circulated freely in Alabama. Much of the South heard of tb 
arr est of the entire 44th Indiana Volunteers for depredation· 
committed in Stevenson, Alabama, but the emphasis was Lr. 
the crime rather than the arrest.1'1 More interesting to tbt 
former Confederates were stories of robbery and murder con:· 
mitted by the "Bluebellies.m- Tales of horror like the litt 
Negro girl whose ears were cut off by a soldier because sh 
refused his advances, were believed and repeated.18 And when 
soldier s shot unarmed prisoners as soon as they appeared, jailed 
a butcher (the victim of a robbery and assault, during which hi~ 
wife was almost killed) for proferring charges against a Xegr 
or whipped, then dragged a white man until he almost died 
the perfidity and unnatural, arbitrarily-exercised power of tb 
military was clearly proved.10 
It is no wonder that trouble erupted between the locals. 
both white and Negro, and t he occupying forces. Fights occurred 
everywhere. The streets were the usual setting, as when a 
Negro drew a revolver on an officer, but even "a house of ill· 
repute" in Greenville hosted a br awl between "some citizens an 
soldier s.":!<• Some idea of the local feeling can be gained by seeing 
not only what was said while under "soldier rule," but com· 
ments made later as well. When reporting the arbitrary pun· 
ishment and imprisonment of a local citizen, editor Lon Grant 
of the Gadsden Times observed that "such injustice made the 
111 Mobile, Register and Adt·rrtisrr, September 21, 1865. 
1
' Ibid., August 25, 1865; September 4, 1865; McNair, "Bullock Count}'. 
Fleming, Ch1il War, 119-120. 
10 Mobile, Register and Adtwfiser, January 12, 1866. 
~~ Fleming, Ci 1 ·il \\1' ar, 5 00; Mobile Register and Ad t•ertmr, October 6. IS65 
bert L. Watson, " Gadsden from Tepees to Steamboats," Alabama Rw• 
(October, 1958 ), 252. 
20 Mobile Register and Adt•rrtisrr, September 19, 1865, March 10, 1866 
Negro, Henry, was probably so quick with his gun because the troopers lMlW 
to pick Negroes to victimize. January 7, 9, 11, 18 66. 
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olood boil and the fingers tingle to pull the trigger again 
on our oppressors.ml Editor Forsyth reprinted the more re-
served remarks of a Montgomery newspaperman that "Such 
inhumanities should be ferretted out and the guilty parties 
punished severely whoever they may be. Where the civil author-
ity has not power to act the military certainly has, and we trust 
between the two, no acts of the kind will be allowed to disgrace 
the community."~ Perhaps the best clue is in the statement of 
the Eufaula News after the shooting of two Negroes: "Such 
baseness and meanness, now that the Yankees have left, will 
not again be perpetrated with impunity in our midst. We hope, 
now, to see the return of law, order, and quiet; and hear no 
more of the robbing, shooting, or maltreating of negroes."!!.') 
And the men these troops helped maintain in office fared no 
better in public opinion. 
To keep power, the Republicans had to run Republicans for 
office, no matter how unqualified. Though there were ex-
ceptions, ignorance and corruption pervaded most levels of 
go\'ernment. Even a Republican admitted the problems of find-
ng qualified men of the proper political persuasion, going so 
far as to call the state courts "a farce ." As late as 1871, three 
years before the government was "redeemed," the New York 
Times observed that the civil authorities were "utterly power-
tis to execute the laws."24 When the military authorities in 
Montgomery permitted prostitution and legalized it by issuing 
censes to "houses of ill-repute" for $25 a week plus $5 a week 
r each inmate, the local citizens complained bitterly. But 
ben that apostle of social control, Justice of the Peace Jesse 
Watson, "Gadsden," 252. 
Mobile Register and Ad-vertiser, January 12, 1866, quoting the Adt•erliser oi 
January 9. 
Quoted in the Mobile Register and Advertiser, January 25, 1866. 
loore, Alabama, 482; Fleming, Civil War, 656; Affairs in Alabama, I, 58, II, 
n; New York Times, June 28, 1871. \Vhen the legislature passed an act 
thorizing the Governor to pardon men before their conviction, the native 
1h1tes were sure chis was simply one more attempt to keep misfits in office 
and outside the law's reach. Mobile Register and Advertiser, June 17, 18 66. 
A Republican realized that "we had placed in power a great many incompetent 
ff1cers, men who were totally unfit either by their moral or their mental 
luramr to administer the laws." Lucille Griffith, History of Alabama 1540-
0 (~orrhport, 1962 ) , 341. 
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Hays, was sentenced to five months and a $100 fine for pre· 
scribing a punishment for a Negro which was inapplicable to 
a white man, the Republicans went too far. Though merely a 
symbol, this Monroe County man personified the necessity for 
regaining Democratic control of the government.2G 
The attempt to wrest control from the "vile wretches in 
power" would naturally necessitate the use of force. First, thr 
average voters were tired of voting when they felt their votes 
meant nothing.20 Second, the Republicans would use every hinl 
of violence as proof of the necessity of continuing Reconstruction 
and even manufactures tales to prove their allegation. Demo· 
crats evidently felt that they might as well profit from what 
they were portrayed as doing. 27 And finally, the Conservati\'e.s 
saw their attempt to cajole the Negro vote fail. Their speaker~ 
were "insulted, stoned, and sometimes killed," while social ostra· 
cism (and more drastic measures-whipping, for instance) by 
and large preserved the Negro vote inviolately Repulican. 
Even the New York Times noted the fraudulent government, 
the unqualified leaders, and the absolute hold corruption had 
on much of the state government.20 So the Conservatives spoke 
of driving out "the thieves" and convinced themselves, one by 
one, that " If the radicals carry this county and the state, we 
will be well nigh ruined.1130 
~~ fleming, Ch,il War, 416-417, 487. 
za 1 bid., 53 5, 542; Hilary A. Herbert, " How \'V' e Redeemed Alabama," Cor/MrJ 
Magazine, LXXXV (April, 1913), 854, 857; Edgar A. Stuart, "The ]ourn1l f 
James Mallory, 1834-1877," Alabama Review, XIV (July, 1961), 231. 
zr I t was admitted by both sides that, while many were true, many of the stones 
of outrages were fiction. DuBose, "Stirling," 323-324; Fleming, Citil \VI', 
3 99; John L. Sloan, " The Ku Klux Klan and the Alabama Election of 1872• 
Alabama Review, XVII (April, 1965), 114-115, 118, 120-121, 123. By tbt 
time the Republicans developed factions, the more conservative ones, like 
William H. Smith, charged their more radical opponents with "feeding off 
. " cnme. 
z~ Negro women were especially effective in keeping the Negro vote Rcpubllc 
No Democrat got a meal cooked, cloches washed, or a warm bed, not even frCII 
his wife. On both sides, the women were more rabid than the men. Flmlllllo 
Ch·il '\7 ar, 77 4, 778; Herbert, "Redeemed," 8 60; H. E. Sterkx, "~7illi.un C. 
Jordan and Reconstruction in Bullock County, Alabama," Alabama Rr1 
XV (January, 1962), 71. 
~0 October 29, 1874, December 31, 1865, for example. Generally rteognt!JOI 
came during the latter part of the era. 
:to Stewart, "Mallory Journal," 231,232. 
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The milieu provided the native whites with a "f eel" for 
'olence inherited from the f rontier and the ante bellum era, a 
•tuation aggravated by specific grievances which called for 
prompt action . Not only were direct methods the natural 
r.clination; they seemed the only recourse for the "disinherited." 
F r the Negroes and Republicans, t he problem was s imilar. It 
as their presence which upset t he traditional system, so it 
as against them that the brutality w ould be directed. It was 
case of resist or abdicate. A feeling of suspieion and hate was 
the air, and all sides-Negro, Democrat and Republican-
e\'eloped a regretable tolerance for bloodshed. But there were 
reasons for the adoption of violence by the Negroes and Republi-
ns aside from the essentially negative one of self-preser vation . 
e Republicans employed ferocity to maintain their political 
(and strengthen it) , to correct situations which seem-
gly would yield to no other solutions, and out of fear; the 
'egroes adopted terrorism because of their sense of f r eedom, 
political conjurings of their leaders (Negro and white), and 
t of fear as well. The opposing forces gave much the same 
for their fury-each essentially feared the other, and 
saw some facet of the political scene which seemed amean-
e to change only through force. 
The Republicans were faced with an int ractable element 
govern. Jesse Hays was a symbol for them as well as for 
Democrats. To Republicans, Justice of the Peace Hays 
m1tu the obstinate Alabamian who refused to abide by the 
·ion of the iron dice he h ad rolled. Through out Recon-
~tlon . Republicans had to contend with courts which could 
no justice because of lack of witnesses or because 
simply fai led to convict.31 To those in power, justice 
unattainable. A major Republican complaint was al-
of ineffective courts and local government.~2 Because of 
situation, the Republicans had no alternative but to reply 
'nd if they wished to end the intimidation of Negro Republi-
Though the Legislature could remove all penalties for 
r m :\fabama, I, 58; New York Tim es, June 28, 1871; Igna tius A. Few 
1th, July 19, 1869; Colored Citizens of Tuscaloos:~ to Smith, April 22, 1869, 
am H. Smith Papers. 
ms i11 Alabama, I, 58; Ignatius A. Few to Smith, July 19, 1869; Colored 
<Aciuns of Tuscaloosa to Smith, Apri l 22, 1869, Will iam H. Smi th Papers . 
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.. ·iolence in 1872, the Daily Advertiser once again h ad the last 
·ord: "Ven zee Frenchman hunt zee t igarre, zee sport ees 
grand-manifique, but by gar ven zee tigarre hunt ze French-
rr.an zer ess the vaire daiable to pay." Substitute Yankee for 
Frenchman and 'r ebel' for tiger in this quotation and the pic-
ture is true to the very life." 11 Unfortunately, the Democrats 
did not let the matter rest there. 
As Reconstruction progressed, the language became more 
nflammatory. Articles speculating on the future would be 
~ven such provocative titles as "Bayonets Next.,.5 A forthright 
challenge was issued by the Mobile Registe'r in 187 4. Calling on 
he "Blearyeyed gent r y," the editor warned them that 
white violence will keep pace with black vio-
lence; that for one blow they shall h ave two, 
with full measure; that there shall be no more 
polls in quiet possession of negro mobs, and white 
men deterred from casting their ballots, and all 
under the command of carpet-bag bullies If 
you can beat us in voting, all right. If you can 
beat us at bullying, all right too. But in both 
cases you have got to f ight for it as you have 
never been called upon, in Alabama, to fight be-
fore. 
lling for a vir tual surrender to Caucasian Supremacy, the 
article concluded : " first disarm your negroes, who are 
lling and drum-beating everywhere, in every town and vil-
lage and hill and valley, and then talk about p eace to the white 
ple."14 
While challenging the Republicans in such rash terms, 
natives often spoke longingly of a return to the more dig-
violence of the Confederacy period. That was a time 
n foes could be dealt with openly, and it bespoke a kind of 
ted in Robert Partin, "Alabama Newspaper Humor during Reconstruction," 
Al.bamQ Reticw, XVII (October, 1964), 245-6, For an indication of how the 
acpublicans were lambasted by political cartoons, see Sarah Van V . Woolfolk, 
ihe Political Cartoons of the Tuscaloosa Indebendcnt Monitor and Tuscaloosa 
-~Mt 1867-1873," Alabama Historical Quarterl'y, XXVli ( Fall , 1965), 140-165. 
Mobile Rrgislrr and Advertiser, June 29, 1866. 
Quoted in New York Times, September 5, 1874. 
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demoralization" fo llowed the conflict. The Mobile Register and 
Adve1·tiser hailed Governor Lewis H. Parsons' proclamation on 
the alarming prevalence of crime in the state, though it lamented 
the necessity for such a public statement:~ James Mallory1 ~ 
perceptive denizen of the state, calendared the development o: 
the war-caused lawlessne~s . Less than a month after Appomat· 
tox, :Mallory mourned the "disorder and lawlessness througf. 
the land" and expressed the fear that "order will never be agair. 
restored.' ' By the end of the year he observed that HCrime has 
become alarming, and with the strong arm of the law failing 
to check it, we may yet reap more bitter fruit than even from 
the war." In the middle of 1867, with a sense of foreboding, 
Mallor y wondered-"what will be the r esult, God only knows." 
This war-engendered lawlessness was encouraged by the epi· 
t hets both sides delighted in employing, and by the rumors such 
unbridled tongues spread. Democrats and Republicans alike 
resorted to language calculated to infuriate the opposition; the 
Democrats were probably more adept at using invectiYe, despite 
their inclination to action. 
Republicans fo und themselves the butt of jokes, the objects 
of personal threats, members of a maligned group, and eren 
heard Conservatives wish for a return to the gray uniform 
Prodding the "oppressors" in such a way as to enjoy a laugh 
at their expense became a prime pastime for Alabama edi· 
tors. In 1866 the Montgomery Daily AdveTtiser informed its 
readers of the habits of the "Puritan Reformers" (Northern 
missionaries). "\¥ife," the reported conversation went, "pu 
the baby to sleep with some laudanum, then bring me my Bibl 
and pistols, and come with me; I'm going to attend a meetillf 
for the relief of the freedman and the amelioration of the 
human race." Two years later the same paper attempted 
enlighten its clientele about the Radical. On March 14, 
schoolboy "parsed Radical" for the public: 11A Radical is 
compound unconstitutional noun, black in person, declining 
number, African gender, and desperate case, governed by DJI 
gers, and according to the Puritan rule, one ignoramous go 
erns another." And when the Radicals complained of Southenl 
, .. 
· Aug ust 25, 1865 . 
' <ircwart, "Mallory .Journ.tl," 228, 229, 230. 
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:o the Government.113~ The atrocity stories, whether true or 
!alse, could not have helped a Republican's peace of mind; 
neither were they a source of solace to the f reedman. 
Having been slaves, the freedmen knew what to expect. 
They no doubt also gloried in t he power t heir votes gave them. 
~ow that they comprised a free work force, they also had an 
economic hold on their former master s. The vote, however, 
~eemed to be their most potent weapon, and the fear that this 
privilege would be r emoved was skillfully played on by white 
Republicans. White Alabamians clearly displayed their resent-
ment of the Negro franchise. Even those who had never owned 
la\'es were opposed to this innovation, and a Republican in the 
state noted that these former non-slaveowners were more 
itterly opposed "than any secessionist in the state." The 
ntire white population of :Mobile, observed another, had as 
much as declared that "the 'nigger' should not be permitted to 
ote there.mn After spending three months in the state, a New 
York Tirnes correspondent wrote ; "in some localities they 
[Negroes] are treated brutally, robbed on the highway and 
frequently killed." 1" An antagonism quickly arose between 
bites and blacks, and while the Negroes no doubt armed them-
out of a sense of freedom, it was also done because for the 
st time they could defend themselves. There was no more need 
passively to accept whatever violence came to them:' 
The effect of the war on society and the intemperate lang-
used by both sides added to the explosive atmosphere. The 
set the tone. A resort to public force, war loosened the 
of moral restraint, encouraging individuals to imitate 
public example and take the law into t heir own hands. Since 
trend could not be offset by a strong magistr acy, "public 
rw York Times, January 13 , 1873. 
bodc1, "Registration," 126, 127, quoting letters from Jaseph C. Bradley (April 
1867) and ]. Silsby (April I, 1 8 67) to Gen. Wager Swayne. 
117, 1866. 
lc Rtgister and 1\drertiser, January 10, 1866, AuguH 25, 28, 1865, Sep-
bcr 10, 1865, february 4, 1866; Herbert, "Redeemed," R54. Col~>red Citizens 
Tuscaloosa to Smith, April 22, 1869, William H. Smith Papers. That the 
Its didn't like negroes carrying arms is attested to by For~yth's editorial ad-
ng the freedmen to quit carrying concealed wl!:tpons. Mobil e Register and 
w/isrr, March I 5, 18 6 6. 
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killing a man if he were disguised, more direct action w::ls calleJ 
for. At every hand Republicans found the registration oi 
Negroes opposed. The locals used every method possible "with· 
out making themselves liable to arrest by the military authorities" 
at first. Then they escalated their activities to include night· 
riding and, later, murder. Officials as well as voters suffered. 
Intimidation of this variety later gave way to rowdyism at 
Republican meetings and at the polls themselves. Riots were 
common on election day, and some were so bad that martial 
law was proclaimed and civil officials replaced because the) 
had not been zealous in ending the fighting and protecting th~ 
freedmen. ' 
About five thousand Northerners had come to Alabama In 
an apolitical capacity, and these men were readily accepted bJ 
the natives. A Republican wrote that a business partner had 
received only the "kindest treatment" and heartiest encourage-
ment" from neighbors . "A Northern man," he concluded, 11who 
is not a natural fool, or a foolish fanatic, may live pleasant!. 
anywhere in Alabama " !\II But once the Yankee left business 
for politics, he crossed into the war zone. Often Republicans 
expressed the belief, privately or in public, that many Southern· 
ers were ready to renew the war, possibly by guerrilla action 
But even more insistent in the Republican's minds lurked th 
thought of personal danger. Outside observers noted that 
"Quarrels are sought with men of known Republican politi 
for the simple purpose of af:f':)rding an opportunity to assassin· 
ate them," with their only crime being that of "remaining lo)al 
Ach of Alabama, 1868, 444-6; Rhodes, " Registration," 131. 
:.1 Ignatius A. Few to Smith, July 19, 1869; Colored Citizens of Tus.:JlOOSJ" 
Smith, April 22, 1869; Daniel Price to Smith, October 7, 1868; John H3m 
co Smith, August 5, 1869; Jacob Fisher to Smith, June 14, 1869, \\'ilh~m H. 
Smith Papers; New York Times, January 13, 1873. Sec footnote\ { r 
murder of Alex:~nJcr \Xfcbb, Register . 
. .:. Herbert, "Redeemed," 862; Fleming, Cil il W' ar, 794. The biggest riots occd 
in 1874, at Mobile, Belmont, Gainesville, and Eufaula. Mobile suffmd 
ea rlier ones, in 1866 and 1869 (after the first of which m:~ru.tl il\\' \U 
claimed) and Patona-Cro~s Plains suffered in 1870. Fleming covers most { 
riots. The Mobile riots made the N ew York Times. 
"'' Rhodes, "Registration," 121; Sa rah Van V. Woolfolk, "CarpetbJggtrs a 
bama: Tradition Versus Truth," Alabama Rrl'iew, XV (April, 1962), 14) 
~; Mobile Rrgislrr and Ad t rrliser, March I 0, 1866. 
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freedom which Democrats felt they now lacked. "I am ready as 
before," wrote George M. Drake, editor of the Union Springs 
Times, "to bear arms to the best of my poor ability, against all 
infamous Radical enemies of my State and of the cause of 
civil liberty."" Often such reveries would be coupled with a 
personal threat, as when William C. Jordan, white Alabamian, 
lost his temper when confronted by a blue-uniformed officer. 
Pointing a steady forefinger at the uniform he recalled how he 
had often fired at just such a target during the war. And 
Jordan concluded that, unless left alone, he was willing to fight 
again, observing that "a pistol ball will make negro heads go 
up like a whirlwind."·•s 
The election of 187 4 proved the culmination of the fight 
to "redeem" the state government. It was also the high poin! 
of threats delivered with political intent. The natives were in· 
tent upon ousting the Republicans and exerted every effort to 
do so. Sure that 1874 was their year, the Democrats warned 
Negroes what might be in the future. A Negro canvassing for 
an "ebony congressman" was matter-of-factly told by a white 
"You might as well quit. We have made up our minds to carry 
the state or kill half of you negroes on election day." Another 
Conservative like-wise enlightened a "sable Republican" about 
the coming campaign. "God damn you," he shouted, 11JOU ha\'e 
voted my land down to half a dollar an acre, and I wish you was 
down in the bottom of hell." He then theatened personally to 
help send a few on their way.'w 
The natives did not have a monopoly on unbridled tongue~ 
Their political opponents were skilled in the use of invecti\'e, 
and they had the help of newspapers and politicians outside the 
state. Though hardly a danger, Chicago's "Long John" Went· 
worth's threat to hang Confederates "as high as Haman" wa 
not easily forgotten. Negroes, well-aware of their freedom, at 
times angered men accustomed to unquestioning obedience. By 
stating that something was none of the questioner's business 
41 Letter to the Montgomery Adt·rrtiser, quoted in the New York Tilnrs, No1t 
berl,l868. 
• A H. E. Stcrkx, "William C. Jordan and Reconstruction in Bullock Counry, Ala 
bama," 65, 71. 
''" Fleming, Cit •il War, 792. 
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'he freedmen would throw the native into a rage. "Insolence" 
and "uppity behavior" were, to the former rulers in a slave 
~iety, if not crimes, at least completely unacceptable behav-
ior: Taking their politics ver y seriously, t he mostly-Republi-
tl:n former slaves regarded any Democrat in their midst as a 
~renegade nigger." Often an intrepid black Democrat would 
be greeted with cries of "Beat him; kill him; kill the Democrat 
'el'il." When questioned about washing or cooking for such a 
misfit, one old woman said, "Wash him a shirt ? I'll wash his 
~ se in blood."", Coupled with Republican complaints of Demo-
cratic violence in circulars which in effect a dvised Republicans 
tJ do as they pleased (after all, troops and U.S. Marshals wer e 
l'ailable in case of trouble), such language infuriated the na-
. . \·e· -b. 
Both sides used the newspaper with great effectiveness, 
nd except for verbal threats, t he daily and weekly sheets 
ade maddening an ever-increasing number of people a pos-
'bility. The same drunken brawl would, with opposite interpre-
tations placed upon it, be construed by Radical papers as a 
urderous attack on Negr oes and by Democratic journals as 
~egro outrage on whites. Though newspapers were bound by 
w to keep within the bounds of "legitimate discussion" and 
iolent and incendiary articles" wer e banned, moderation was 
nerally an unheard of virtue. The Mobile R epublican, for ex-
ample, was suppressed by General P ope for "instructing the 
negro population how, when and for what purpose to use fire-
arms-being a direct and distinct attempt t o incite them to 
and disorder."'·, 
When such open appeals to violence were made, especially 
nsidering the reasons the various groups had to r esort to force, 
outcome was almost inevitable. The effect of these grievances 
uced an extremely tense situation, especially at election 
All types of violence wer e perpetrated by bands and by 
The personal and economic manifestations of the 
am B. Hesseltine and Larry Gara, "Confederate Leaders in Post-War Ala-
ama," Alabama Ret'iew, IV (January, 1951), 5, 18; New York T imes, Novem-
4, 1874; DuBose, "Mount Stirling," 322. 
cw York Times, November 4, 1874. 
rt, Alabama, 467, 486; New York Times, September 2 1, 1874. 
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resulting clashes were political in nature, for they would have 
been unnecessary had the old social structure remained-Ala· 
bama had been a two-party state before the formation of tht 
Republican party. There was more than the normal amount 
of crime immediately after the war. River pirates flourished 
and armed bands roamed rural regions. Even the urban areas, 
though better policed than the outlying sections, faced an up· 
surge of crime. l\Iobile testified to that fact as Editor Forsyth 
remarked on the unsightliness of a particular post near the 
post office, generally spattered with brains and surrounded by 
pools of blood, and lamented the amount of crime in the city.' 
The activities of marauding bands were doubtless the most non· 
political of all. Republican and Democrat alike suffered from 
the roaming bands of criminals. Republicans and Conser\'atires 
also both suffered f r om "economic violence." Once the Negro 
became a free agent, his labor was his own to sell, and agricul· 
ture, which had flourished under the hands of slaves, still 
required laborers. The transition from a slave to a free 
economy, difficult at best, was resented by employers who had 
to pay wages. lVIany found the change unbearable, and without 
political power to ameliorate what they considered an injustice. 
the "disinherited" turned to force. ~.:. 
While they generally scheduled their exploits so as to ID· 
sure time to do their own work and were careful not to frighten 
away their own laborers, the Democratic "regulators" tried t 
control the hiring of Negroes. Often the poorer whites would 
drive Negro tenants from the more fertile lands and move in 
behind them. :More usual was the practice of riding in and 
telling Negroes who to work for and at what price, then 
threatening drastic measures if matters went contrary to order 
Often employers of former slaves would see gin houses, fences. 
and stock destroyed or their employees "maltreated" 
:.a Fleming, Cit ·d W'ar, 497; New York Times, ~~larch 26, 1866, June}, 1867 
ro~ Mobile Regisl rr fllld Ad L'rrliser, January 9, I 866, December 2, I 865. One 
the big Mobile stories from December, 1865 through May of the next )ear 
of the band of guerrillas on the Tombigbee who captured the steamboat Ull) 
attempted to sink the Belfast. In North Alabama brigandage was such 
g uerrilla warfare was the practical result as "Federal and Confederate d-... 
and bushwackcrs and outlaws of every description" fought each other. FlemiJII, 
Ciuil War, 654, 264-8; Moore, Alabama, 463. 
:.·. Fleming, Cil'il \\'1' ar, 654, 264 - 8. 
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they had hired the wrong freedmen"o Wherever the N egTo 
:urned he faced trouble because he was an economic threat to 
one group or another. White transient workers clashed with 
freedmen on the Mobile and Girard Railroad near Union Springs 
O\'er the question of jobs on the railroad:·• And even in politics, 
the Negro proved a threat as he voted land prices down.·- This 
was just a part of the link between economics and politics in 
Reconstruction Alabama. T he connection of personal violence 
vith political preferences was even closer. 
At first, political violence was at a minimum in Alabama. 
A war-weariness or apathy settled like a damp fog on the 
populace; the Republicans faced no real political opposition 
during their first year of power. Then trouble began in earnest.:·:· 
Personal brutality had in the beginning been just that-man 
to man. The leaders of both sides were open game-it seemed 
the rules of the contest.w• Shortly after Appomattox, however, 
two groups were formed which largely took the political aspect 
of savagery from the individual and institutionalized it. The 
Union or Loyal League was a Republican organization mainly 
for its fledglings, the freedmen; the Ku Klux Klan became the 
Democrats' answer to the League threat.n• 
In their incipient stages, the League and the Klan were 
completely different. While the League was primarily a politi-
cal organization, the Klan was a social club which rapidly 
became an association of regulators banded together to provide 
protection for its adherents and a measure of social control."~ 
Ibid., 682, 729; Mobile Rrgisler and Ach·erfisrr, May 8, 1866; Elkor Malichi to 
Smith, July, 1869, William H. Smith Papers. 
McNair, "Bullock County," 88. One Negro wa~ killed and one wounded. Th~ 
wh1te~ suffered no casualties, the only one brought into court being acquitted. 
Fleming, Ci !'il W' ar, 792. 
/b,d., 677. 
Nev.· York Tnnrs, january 13, 187 3; Hesseltine and Gara, "Leaders," 18. 
F r mfornmion on the League, see Fleming, "Union League." For bia~cd a<.:· 
unts of the Ku Klux Klan, sec Stanlt~y F. H orn, l111'i.\iblr EmjJire: Tlx Story of 
lbtKu Klu\ Klan 1866-1871 (Boston, 1939) or Susan L Davis, Aufb('ll/ic His· 
') uf lhc Ku Klu~ Klan (New York, 1924). Mis~ D:wis's father organized 
c first Alabama den at Athens. 
• Toward the end of the era, people began to say that the Klan had been formed to 
counter the League. Sec Fleming, "Loyal League," 88; Fleming, Cit·il Wt~r, 65 S; 
cNair, "Bullock County," 100. 
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Despite the dissimilarity during their inchoate period, both 
groups soon became tools in the struggle for political power in 
Alabama. Bands of Negroes and bands of whites roamed tht 
countryside, especially at night. Alabamians become so familiar 
with this Ku Klux Klan method of political persuasion and social 
control that whenever anyone suffered from any group of dis· 
guised men he was considered "kukluxed." The political activi· 
ties of these groups were largely confined to a few month~ 
before each election, but the frenzy was most intense in 1868 
and 1874. 
The 1868 outbreak was mainly perpetrated by the Klan 
and occasioned by the failure of the natives to enlist Negro 
~mpport for the Democratic Party.'t' "Jail delivery" became 
popular, as Klansmen (and later others) freed prisoners from 
their confinement to insure "justice" -releasing those considered 
unjustly incarcerated and punishing others (often by death): 
The troubles of 187 4 were the culmination of the political power 
struggle. Sensing victory, the Democrats redoubled their 
efforts, and fearing defeat, the Republicans countered with all 
the force at their disposal. As early as July, Governor Lewis 
received letters from the Black Belt complaining of turmoil. 
Factions formed within the Republican Party, and the hatred 
between the two was so intense that civil war almost erupted 
Though busy fighting among themselves, the Republicans found 
time to insult, stone and kill Democrats, break up meetings, 
shoot into Democratic homes, and force conservatives to hide 
out at night.''7 Both parties ran full slates of officers, count) 
as well as state, and feelings ran even higher. Vehement 
,, . .J. Roncrync ro Charles Miller, October 15, 1868; N. H. Rice to \X'illi1m l 
Fi!:urcs, November 3, 18 68; John H. Wager to Smith, William li. Smith P1 
Sec also V. S. Congress, House, 40th Congress, 3rd Session, House Misc. Doc 
Oulragrs by Ku -Kiux Klan . 
... For examples of this common practice, sec A/ fairs i11 Al(/bamtl, I, 57; II, 14 
Mobi le Rrgislrr and J\d1wlisrr, April 3, 1866. 
":. Edw:~rd G. Williamson, "The Alabam:t Election of 1874," AltdJtlltltl Rn 
XVII (July, 1964), 217 . 
.-. Fleming, Ci1·il W'ar, 774; New York TimrJ, October 26, 1874; Herber!, l 
deemed," 860. 
u
7 Fleming, CiL'il W' ar, 774, 778. One Negro complained that his children 
beaten by the others at school. The teacher explained that nothin~: bcrttr c 
be expected so long as he remained a Democrat. 
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language became the rule and few political rallies lasted the 
appointed length of time. When meetings were held to agree 
on candidates for city offices, the discussion became so heated 
that fights often resulted.~R 
Troops were requested to deal with the difficulties. The 
Republicans, in a numerical minority, sent numerous urgent 
requests for a company or so of soldiers and usually a few 
marshals as well.on Little word of trouble leaked out of south 
Alabama, but from the north and west came stories in profusion. 
The Ku Klux Klan, Men of Justice, the Order of Peace, and 
Knights of the White Camelia fought with the various "un-
affiliated" groups of natives against the Loyal League and 
various Anti-KKK leagues (Mossbacks in Fayette County) ,.: 
Joseph G. Hester, a special agent for the Justice Department, 
summed the situation up concisely when he remarked that he 
had "rather be in the heart of Comanche country than in Sumter 
County without soldiers. 117 ' 
The occasion which focused national attention upon Ala-
bama's internal disorder was the occurrence of two murders in 
Sumter County. The first murder, that of lawyer W P 
Billings, was mentioned in the New York Times. But on 
October 6, under the headlines "The Murdered Route Agent" 
and "Warrants for the Arrest of Nine of the Murderers, Includ-
ing the Sheriff of Sumter County," violence in Alabama gained 
national notoriety. For a month, the murder o£ Billings and 
Thomas Ivey rated front page coverage. Several Sumter County 
Itizens-Stephen S. Renfroe, a prominent farmer and pre-
umable instigator of the killings; Charles H. Bullock; P. A. 
Hillman; and W L. (Fred) Childs-were carried to Mobile to 
stand trial for both crimes. In the follow-up story on November 
24, the Times ran a two-column spread on the accused, the trial, 
Herbert, "Redeemed," 854, 860; McNair, "Bullock County," 117. In one such 
ftght one Negro hit through the underlip of another, while a companion "bit 
a plug from the cheek of an adversary." Quoted from the Union Springs Herald 
111J Times, January 13, 1875. 
O~ens, "Riot," 231. 
Gnffith, Alabama, 322, 341, 483; Fleming, Civil \\'l'ar, 657-660, 514-15, 561-2, 
565, 690; Fleming, "Loyal League," 75, 81-2; Horn, Empirf, 136; Affairs in 
Al1bama, II, 721, 1172. 
Ytlliamson, "Alabama Elections," 217. 
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and an "exclusive interview."7~ Concluding the story of the trial, 
the T·i-rnes observed that, despite a Negro politician's threat 
to "carry Sumter County or ride chin-deep in blood," there was 
no evidence of a political connotation for the murders.vl Such 
political connections were admittedly hard to find-these inci· 
dents merely seemed part of the general trend toward anarchy. 
But violence was on the wane. As early as 1869 Alabamians 
had been warned by scalawag Alexander H. White to ''Let 
bygones be bygones." He had had "enough of the bayonet" 
and would rather "rely on the ballot instead."" The Klan, "sym· 
bol of violence in disguise," lost public support.~" Alabamians 
had learned the infinite advantages of fraud at the ballot boxes. 
Where intimidation had been successful, the Democrats 
raced no trouble, though occasionally they simply found it neces· 
~ary to count out the Negro vote or destroy the ballots.'6 The 
polls were carefully guarded by Democrats, and every highway 
leading into the state was monitored "to prevent the importation 
of voters." Railroad officials carefully noted every "foreign 
Negro" who arrived and at what station he debarked.~' The New 
York Ti1nes chronicled the relative quiet of the election after 
the turbulence of the pre-election fury. The writer observed 
that police from Columbus, Georgia, had taken over the pol~ 
at Girard, in Russell County, but did not comment upon the 
effect of this action. That fraud had replaced violence, how· 
ever, the correspondent was certain. With the aid of hindsight, 
a much later article r ealized that, while fraud had replaced 
violence in the last election, "the knowledge existed in the mind 
of every colored man that the Democrats would have resorted 
to violence if simple f raud had not availed.ms 
'" August 14, 1874. 
'" October 6, 7, 8, 20, November 24, 1874; January 10, 1875. See also unpub 
lished manuscript on Stephen S. Renfroe by William Warren Rogers. ~fs. i 
. . pn va te possesswn. 
' ' Sar:th Van V. Woolfolk, "Alabama Attitudes Toward the Republican Pmy 
in 1868 and 1964," Alabama Rrz·iru:, XX (January, 1967), 29-30. 
'" H orn, Em jli rr, 144. 
''' Fleming, Cil'il \\7ar, 798, 800. The Eufaula riot re~ulted in the unfortunatt 
Jestruction of enough R epublican votes to ensure a Democratic victory. Stc 
Owens, "Eufaul:t Riot." 
" Herbert, " Redeemed," 861. 
' ' January 4, 1875, October 9, 1876. The correspondent wrote thJt "Tht 
prosc ription, ~ocial ostracism, withd rawal of business and loss of emplo\·mtnr 
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Thus did the pattern of violence end in Alabama. Perhaps 
·.he most significant indicator of the changed attitude was Grand 
Cyclops Ryland Randolph. For despite his earlier firey-tongued 
el<~quence, the Tuscaloosa editor now called for peace. In an 
editorial entitled "Let Murders Cease" he realized that "We 
r.ow have a sheriff of our choice, and we must sustain him "7~ 
Yiolence had ended because, having regained political power, 
the natives could correct the inequities by which they had felt 
ppressed and exercise social and economic control "legally." 
A few individuals were convinced that the trouble had always 
been due to simple reasons. A New York Ti1nes correspondent 
related that those to whom he talked blamed the turbulence on 
drunkenness."' Others cited a break-down of communications 
between the two sides, which led to the accession to power of 
bad men.' The New York Tirnes observed darkly that Alabama 
earned to kill men for opinion's sake, and "she is now showing 
how power, secured by the deadly bullet of the assassin, may 
be perpetuated by the bogus ballot of the Registrar.m~ The 
democratic process was, of course, ignored. Power once at-
tained, had to be kept. There was no chance for a return to the 
ituation of Reconstruction. Fear had motivated much of the 
\iolence in Reconstruction Alabama, but that it was politically 
rooted is shown by the decrease in violence once the natives 
regained their accustomed place of power. 
In Reconstruction Alabama, violence became an instrument 
f policy, an instrument used by all segments of the political 
pectrum. The moderates as well as both extremes either 
believed or found it a necessity. The savagery's forn1 varied, 
and it was used both as an offensive and as a defensive weapon. 
While its immediate effects can be measured, or at least docu-
among Republicans" was due to politics, and that such action caused "thousands 
f ~otm" to be lost by the Republicans. 
Quoted in Horn, Empire, 140. 
Much 26, 1866. This view was given some credence by the Montgomery 
Al1trliser's observation that "one of the most favorable signs of a better day 
dawmng" was "the decline in the drinking of whiskey," a beverage which was 
osmg its place to lager beer. Quoted in the Mobile Register and Advertiser, 
April 24, 1866. 
Rhodes, "Registration," 141. This would help account for the fear and wild 
rumors prevalent on both sides. 
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mented, the use of force to achieve political ends and influnce 
every facet of life-social and economic as well as political-
had far-ranging consequences. Such a resort to violence proved 
a tragic precedent for the nation, especially the New South, for 
even while fostering a permissive attitude toward violence, this 
experience showed that such a course of action could be success· 
ful, especially when the cost was ignored. 


